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### ABSTRACT:

Committees' use of their right to initiate parliament decisions have notably evolved under Sweden's unicameral parliament. Since 2011, initiatives have increasingly served as a political instrument tactically employed by opposition parties against the will of government parties. Since the fall of 2020, this trend has risen radically, indicating that this constitutional tool is gradually being used in conflict with its original purpose. Increase in conflict levels and fragmentation within political landscape (from five to eight parliamentary parties) correspond with this escalated utilisation of committees' initiative powers. These developments raise doubts about political parties' ability to adhere to the lawmaker's presuppositions that committee initiatives should be used with caution and in the pursuit of unity. Our data lends some support to earlier research's view of committee initiatives as potential expressions of inter-party conflict, but it also highlights the need for further qualitative studies into parties' motives for employing this parliamentary instrument.

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