


DIRECCIÓN DE SERVICIOS DE INFORMACIÓN Y ANÁLISIS ESPECIALIZADOS
SUBDIRECCIÓN DE REFERENCIA ESPECIALIZADA

ALERTA

HEMEROGRÁFICA

No. 413
JUNIO 2024



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ABSTRACT:

Theories of aggregated legislative intent posit that the legislative intent of parliament is what a significant enough proportion of legislators intended (e.g., legislative intent is p if a majority intend that p). After all, many think the same way about democracy ('votes reveal the will of the people') and about courts ('a court decision is based on judicial voting'). The existing literature on aggregated legislative intent, however, tends to make two undefended assumptions: (i) Informed Assumption: all legislators have policy intentions; and (ii) Group Intent Assumption: the existence of an aggregated intent entails the existence of a group intent. Despite these assumptions being subject to great scrutiny, they largely remain undefended. This paper defends the Group Intent Assumption and shows that aggregated theories can survive with a weaker version of the Informed Assumption.

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