

DIRECCIÓN DE SERVICIOS DE INFORMACIÓN Y ANÁLISIS ESPECIALIZADOS
SUBDIRECCIÓN DE REFERENCIA ESPECIALIZADA

ALERTA HEMEROGRÁFICA

No. 379
OCTUBRE 2023



Título: *Wartime legislative political inclusivity and the likelihood of negotiated ends to civil wars.*

Autor: John Ishiyama

Revista: The Journal of Legislative Studies, Sep2023 .pp. 1-18.

Editorial: Lord Philip Norton of Louth - University of Hull, UK.

ISSN: 1743-9337

Versión electrónica: <https://bit.ly/3s3qeJ7>

Nota: Disponible para consulta en los servicios las Bases de Datos Institucionales para la Cámara de Diputados.

Si usted desea adquirir la publicación, favor de dirigirse a: 5 Howick Place, London, SW1P 1WG, UK.

Teléfono: +44 (0) 20 8052 0400

Página web: <https://www.tandfonline.com/>

ABSTRACT:

Many scholars have argued that political inclusivity helps pre-empt civil war incidence and helps build peace and democracy after a civil war ends. However very little work has been done on assessing the effects of the inclusivity of war time legislatures on how civil wars end. This paper addresses this lacuna using the ‘diversity in leadership’ approach to explain the likelihood of negotiations initiated to end civil wars. This approach holds that the inclusion of different political viewpoints leads to innovative solutions to intractable political challenges (such as efforts to end civil wars). Using data from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) and the Database on Political Institutions (DPI) from 1975–2020, I find that relatively more political fractionalised war time legislatures are significantly more likely to lead to attempts at negotiated ends to conflicts, when compared to less fractionalised legislatures. However, the size of the opposition in the wartime legislature, and the presence of legalised political wings of rebel groups, are unrelated to whether a negotiated settlement occurs (a finding that questions the idea that representation of anti-government views help bring about efforts at peace).

SUMMARY:

Abstract	1
Literature	3
Hypothesis 1: Greater political diversity in a state’s national legislative assembly increases the likelihood of conflict termination via negotiations.	6
Hypothesis 2a: The greater the representation of opposition parties in the wartime legislature the greater the likelihood of movement toward conflict termination via negotiation	7

Hypothesis 2b: If rebel groups exist as legal political entities in a given year, the greater the likelihood of movement toward conflict termination via negotiation.	7
Hypothesis 3: Greater political diversity in a state's national legislative assembly decreases the likelihood of conflict termination via negotiations (or has no effect)	9
Data and variables	11
Methods and results	12
Table 1. Descriptive statistics	12
Table 2. Coefficient estimates, odds ratios and variance inflation factor scores. Dependent variable settlement/ceasefire in a given war year. Firth logistic regression results	14
Conclusions	17
Notes	18
References	18